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SPECIAL ANALYSIS

Europeans."

ussr - Western et	CIA	cern Over Det	ence	25X1
The USSR is ince to its military invocarefully nurtured recent campaign again to disengage West Eumeasures of retaliatencourage—any evideing greater independent	lvement in Afrelations with inst theater naropean governation against the	ghanistan will Europe. As woulear forces, ments from the USSR. Moscowest Europeans	as the case with its Moscow is striving US and its proposed	
As US-Soviet closer US-Chinese working relations essential to the pean security concooperation, and the Soviets want tions from partic Olympic Games or	e cooperation with We USSR. Moso decriping to decrease to discouraginating in	on have increstern Europe cow wants to estall closer o's plans for age major Wes a US-led boy	has become more allay West Euro- NATO military TNF. Moreover, t European na- cott of the	r 25X1
The current the fundamental d ests as well as U NATO. President Pravda interview o	lifferences US "arrogand Brezhnev so	in US and We ce" in imposi ound <u>ed these</u>	ng its will on	
In personal their press commethat the US is an	entary, the	Soviets also		

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dangerous and capricious foreign policy actions primarily in response to domestic political imperatives. As the West Europeans seem to give more serious consideration to joining the US in retaliation against the USSR--partly as a result of the move to silence Andrei Sakharov--Moscow is warning that "the price will be paid primarily by the

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West Germany's Role

Moscow recognizes that West Germany will play the central role in any West European consensus on policy against the USSR. The Soviets initially took a cautious, 25X1 largely conciliatory line with the Schmidt government, urging it not to allow the US to "stab detente in the back." In their more recent dealings with Bonn, however, the Soviets have not minced words.

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The Soviets also have hinted that anti-USSR policy decisions could result in economic damage to the Schmidt government and undercut its electoral position. In its press commentary, Moscow has reminded Bonn that Soviet retaliation to any embargo would broaden unemployment. At the same time, the Soviets have held out the inducement of economic benefits; West German banking officials reportedly are being approached with requests to assume the financing of projects previously understood to have US, French, or Japanese backing.

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Moscow is linking Schmidt's expected visit to the USSR before the West German elections this fall to the overall state of Soviet - West German relations. It has clamped down on official East European contacts with Bonn, in part to indicate to Schmidt that he cannot routinely conduct business with the East Europeans if West Germany applies sanctions on the USSR.

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Elsewhere in Europe

Moscow has made a special effort to encourage France's sustained refusal to entertain the idea of an economic boycott or other major retaliatory gesture against recent Soviet policy moves. The Soviets have emphasized the "special relationship" between the USSR and France, given a top-level reception to the visiting president of the French National Assembly, and sent their First Deputy Foreign Minister to Paris at France's request

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to explain their position. They evident dent Giscard's recent assurance that Pari mitted to the policy of detente an encour of France's future policy toward the USSI	is remains com- raging indication	25X1
Moscow's efforts to obtain the support European Communist parties for its intervistan have had mixed results. The French gave its unequivocal support, while the lish parties criticized the Soviets. The the largest Communist party in Western European to the invasion with its strongest condens of Moscow's foreign policy.	vention in Afghan- n Communist party Italian and Span- Italian party, urope, reacted	25x1
Moscow's Next Moves		
Moscow has already warned several Weernments that it will react sharply to aractions intended to punish the USSR for in Afghanistan.	ny significant	1
The USSR is anxious about the impact pean reaction to Soviet moves will have con Security and Cooperation in Europe revischeduled for November in Madrid. Soviet urge the Europeans to attend the meeting of preserving detente.	on the Conference view session conficials will	
Now that the Soviet refusal to discupostponement of SALT II consideration has East-West arms control dialogue, the Sovimeeting in Madrid as crucial to the conti	s stalled the 2 lets portray the	25X1
serious arms controls talks.		25X1
		2 021 1
Moscow probably will continue to drament to detente to the West Europeans. If for example, indicate greater interest in for a disarmament conference in Europe, we wiously has been unwilling to accept. The may continue to drop hints about a possible troops from Afghanistan to reassure the Westhat the USSR is not planning any further region or elsewhere that could damage Westhat	The Soviets might, France's proposa which Moscow pre- te Soviets also the withdrawal of West Europeans action in that	
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